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Perspective and Responses to Democracy Practices in Indonesia  




This research analyses the concept of leadership within transnational 
Islamic tradition in Indonesia and their response towards democracy, 
particularly within three largest transnational organizations of Tablighi 
Jamaat, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).  Based on an 
extensive literature study and in depth interviews, this research found that: 
first, leadership concept in the tradition of (1) Tablighi Jamaat is called 
“Amir” which is appointed through a dialogue (musyawarah). The Amir is 
responsible to preach ‘the da’wah ‘ala> Minha>j an-Nubuwwah (proselytizing 
Islam using Prophetic methods) through ‘khuru>j fi> sabi>lilla>h; (2) Jemaah 
Tarbiyah is called “Majlis Syuro” as the highest body of the Islamic party 
which functions as “ahlul halli wal ‘aqdi” (the consultative assembly) in its 
political movement represented by Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous 
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Justice Party/PKS); and (3) HTI is called “Khalifah” that calls for the system of 
‘Khila>fah ‘ala> Minha>ji an-Nubuwwah’. Second, those three organizations 
have divergent responses regarding the practice of democracy in Indonesia. 
The responses are (1) Jamaah Tabligh chooses to be apolitical and let its 
followers whether to participate in the democracy or not; (2) Jemaah 
Tarbiyah supports the democracy system by establishing Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), and (3) HTI opposes democracy because the concept is 
born from the capitalist ideology, a kufr system as it created by human and 
is not taken from Shari’ah concept.. 
 
Keywords: Leadership, Transnational Islamic, and Democracy 
 
A. Introduction 
The selection of leaders in Islam is a very important question, as 
exemplified by the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad saw, not 
just to bury the Prophet's body but to resolve the question of who is 
the successor of the Prophet so that there is no horizontal conflict due 
to the leadership conflict between the Muhajirin and Anshar. Finally, 
it was agreed that the successor of the Prophet was Abu Bakr after 
Umar bin Khattab appointed him for replacing the Prophet as a 
mosque priest when the Prophet was sick. 
In Islam, there is no standard rule about the system of 
government that Muslims should adopt, but there is only an order to 
choose a leader. The obligation of leadership is based on a number of 
arguments, namely: (a) the word of Allah in the QS an-Nisa' [4]: 59 
and 83 ordering obedience to the monks, and (b) the Prophet's 
hadith, "Whoever dies in a state of disrepair , then he died in 
ignorance, "If three of you are traveling, then one of them should be 
chosen as leader "and" Verily the man most beloved by and closest to 
his seat of God on the Day of Judgment is the just (leader) … ” 1 
The question of electing a leader in Islam has often caused a 
polemic in the bodies of Islamic organizations, especially in terms of 
power struggles and relations with the country. This is due to the 
difference in understanding the concept of Islamic leadership and the 
system of government in accordance with Islamic teachings. This 
discrepancy arises because the Prophet and his companions 
                                                   
1 Ahmad Khoirul Fata, “Kepemimpinan Dalam Perspektif Pemikiran Politik 
Islam” 2 (1) (Juni 2012): 5. 
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(especially Khulafaur Rosyidin) did not provide any standard 
guidelines in showing leaders. 
In this study, the researchers attempt to delve into the concept of 
Islamic leadership conceptualized by three transnational Islamic 
ideologies that have many followers in Indonesia, the Tablighi 
Jamaat, the Jemaah Tarbiyah affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia [HTI] affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir 
(HT) and how these ideologies respond to the practice of democracy 
in Indonesia. To obtain these data, this study used a qualitative 
approach by analyzing primary sources (literature review) and 
interviewing informants with insights on these three ideologies. 
The Tablighi Jamaat Movement is a preaching movement under 
the guidance of the Prophet (Da'wa>h 'ala> Minha>j an-Nubuwwah) 
with the Khuru>j' fi> Sabi>lilla>h method at the center of society that 
centers his preaching on mosques. According to Kamaruzzaman, the 
movement was initiated by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas bin 
Muhammad Ismail al-Hanafi ad-Diyubandi al-Jisti al-Kahdahlawi 
(1885-1944), a Sufi scholar who was at Deobond in 1927 in Mewat, 
South Delhi, India.2 Noorhaidi Hasan called it a purely political 
philosophy and focused more on individual moral reforms.3 
According to O. Roy, Barbara cites it as a "new-fundamentalist" 
movement limited to sharia practice in matters of ritual, dress, and 
behavior that have no systematic ideology or global political 
agenda.4 
Farish A. Noor, quoted by Roland Gunawan referred to the 
Jama'ah Tabligh's notion of the "literalist fundamentalist pietist 
movement", or the faith movement as rooted in Islamic 
fundamentalism (the Quran-Sunnah) as the cornerstone and 
                                                   
2 Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “The History of Jama‘ah Tabligh in 
Southeast Asia: The Role of Islamic Sufism in Islamic Revival,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of 
Islamic Studies 46, no. 2 (26 Desember 2008): 356–357. 
3 Noorhadi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Search for Identity in 
Post-New Order  Indonesia Translated by Hairus Salim (Jakarta: LP3ES associate with 
KITLV Jakarta, 2008).  
4 Barbara D. Metcalf, Aktivisme Islam Tradisional: Deoband, Tabligh, dan Talib 
dalam Dick van der Meij, Dinamika Kontemporer dalam Masyarakat Islam, (terj.) oleh 
Somardi, (Jakarta: INIS, 2003). 
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interpreted both literally (harfiyah).5 While Abdul Aziz called the 
movement a peaceful fundamentalist. Abdul Aziz cited Mumtaz 
Ahmad's views on some of Tablighi Jamaat's fundamentalism, 
namely: (1) interpreting the Qur'an and the Hadith literally, (2) 
strongly rejecting the liberal Islamic understanding, (3) claiming to 
restore pure Islam, and (4) confident that his movement is based on 
Islam in the face of modernity. 6 
The Jemaah Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia stems from the 
campus propaganda movement. In the 1980s, campus preachers 
began introducing the term "usrah" (family) that adopted Hasan al-
Banna's Muslim Brotherhood. This campus missionary is morphed 
into the official Student Activities Unit (UKM), the Campus Cohort 
(LDK)7 From the Jemaah Tarbiyah or the LDK this is the birth of the 
Indonesian Muslim Student Union (KAMMI)8 as the active center of 
LDK to channel its political aspirations on campus. After Suharto's 
demise on May 21, 1998, KAMMI leaders began considering the 
establishment of an Islamic political party, named the Justice Party 
(PK) which later became the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The PKS 
are the political arm of KAMMI activists to pursue political careers 
through the political party.9  
The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) movement was popularized 
by the Hizbut Tahrir (HT) piloted by al-Ustadz Taqiyudin an-
Nabhani in the Palestinian city of al-Quds [Baitul Maqdis] in 1953.10 
HTI is an Islamic political party that aims to rebuild the Islamic 
State11, that is: The Caliphate led by a caliph who was appointed and 
adopted by the Muslims to run a government based on the Bible and 
                                                   
5 Farish A. Noor, “Roland Gunawan, Menelisik Gerakan Sosial-Keagamaan; 
Jama’ah Tabligh Sebagai Sampel,” t.t., http://rolandgunawan.blogspot.com/ 
2012/02/menelisik-gerakan-sosial-keagamaan.html. 
6 Abdul Aziz, “The Jamaah Tabligh Movement in Indonesia: Peaceful 
Fundamentalist” 11 (3), (2004): 473. 
7 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, cet. ke-3, (Jakarta: KPG 
(Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2012). 
8 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 43. 
9 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 44–45. 
10 Anonim, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir, (terj.) 
Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, cet. ke-5 (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2013), 43. 
11  Anonim, 3. 
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the Prophet's Sunnah12. HT entered Indonesia in the 1980s by 
pioneering preaching on Indonesian campuses which later named 
itself Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).13  
In 2017, HTI was abolished by the Indonesian government for 
rejecting Pancasila's basis as a state. This is explained in Article 59 
paragraph 4 of Law No. The Year 17 of 2017 on the Organization of 
the People is a prohibited institution from embracing, developing, 
and disseminating any teaching or understanding contrary to 
Pancasila.14 HTI's rejection of the principles of Pancasila and the 
practice of democracy in Indonesia can be proved by key doctrines in 
the body of HTI, such as the HT/HTI opposition to democracy 
because of the anti-Islamic concept of Islam that HT/HTI 
understands that sovereignty belongs to shara ', not to the people.15  
 
B. The Concept of Leadership and Transnational Islamic 
Al-Qur'an mentions leaders in several terms, such as Khali>fah, 
Ima>m, Wa>li, Ulil Amri, Qawwa>m, Sult}a>n, Ma>lik, and Za'i>m.16 In 
Arabic, the term leader is called ar-ra'i>s from the word ra'usa-yar'asu-
ra'san wa ri'a>san meaning to lead. The word ar-ra'is> the plural form of 
ru’asa>’ means head, chairman, leader, president, and foreman. The word 
ri'a>sah means leadership.17 The leader is also called al-'Ami>r which is 
derived from the word 'amara-ya'muru-amran-ama>ran which means to 
command and control. The word al-'ami>r plural form 'umara>' means 
Amir, Prince, Crown Prince, King, Chief, Leader, Ruler. The word al-
'ima>rah means knowledge and territory / power of Amir. ” 18 
                                                   
12  Anonim, 23. 
13 Ahmad Musyafiq, “Spiritualitas Kaum Fundamentalis,” Walisongo Jurnal 
Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan Lembaga Penelitian (Lemlit) IAIN Walisongo Semarang 20, 
no. 1 (mei 2012): 64. 
14 “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang RI No. 2 Tahun 2017 
tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang No. 17 Tahun 2013 tentang Organisasi 
Kemasyarakatan” (t.t.). 
15 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Daulah Islam, (terj.) Umar Faruq, cet. ke-7 (Jakarta: 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2012), 341–342. 
16 Zainal Arifin, Tafsir Ayat-Ayat Manajemen Hikmah Idariyah dalam Al-Qur'an 
(Yogyakarta: Prodi MPI FITK UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2019), 22. 
17 Ahmad Warson Munawwir, Al-Munawwir Kamus Arab-Indonesia (Surabaya: 
Pustaka Progressif, 1997), 458–59. 
18 Ahmad Warson Munawwir, 38. 
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The transnational term according to Mark R. Amstutz quoted by 
Abdurakhman means something that extends to or exceeds the 
borders of the country. Transnational movement patterns cannot be 
mapped within conventional political boundaries. The relationship is 
no longer governed by the government but involves the citizens of 
one country and the another citizens.19 While Transnational Islamic is 
a movement beyond the territorial limits of the country. For example, 
Pan Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, HizbutTahrir in 
Lebanon, and Tablighi Jamaat in India. The struggle of the 
transnational Islamic has often criticized those who are different in 
religious practice,20 understand Islam monolithically and reject local 
and spiritual variants of Islam, as a form of false and perverted Islam 
because it is corrupted and immoral.21 
Transnational Islamic is also an Islamic movement that seeks to 
formalize Islam in national law in a number of countries, including 
Indonesia,22 and even "Transnational Islamic" in the discourse of 
Islamism in Indonesia is likely to be pinned on hard-core Islamic 
groups (fundamentalism). Ach. Shaykhu cites results from the 
National Intelligence Agency (BIN), that neofundamentalist Islamic 
ideology is now popular with transnational Islam which is: (1) 
international (transnational), (2) non-national-state movements, but 
the people, (3) dominated by scripturalist thinking, fundamentalism 
or radicalism, and (4) partially adapted to modern ideas and 
instruments. Some of the Islamic organizations that belong to this 
                                                   
19 Abdurakhman, “Gerakan Tarbiyah 1980-2010: Respon Ormas Islam 
Terhadap Gerakan Islam Transnasional” (Disertasi, Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia, 
2013). 
20 Muh. Khamdan, “Pengembangan Nasionalisme Keagamaan Sebagai 
Strategi Penanganan Potensi Radikalisme Islam Transnasional,” ADDIN P3M 
STAIN Kudus 10, no. 1 (2016): 210. 
21 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam 
Transnasional di Indonesia (Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika, (The Wahid Institute 
dan Maarif Institute, 2009), 43. 
22 Rendy Adiwilaga, “Puritanisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Islam 
Transnasional serta Implikasinya Terhadap Pancasila sebagai Ideologi Bangsa,” 
Journal of Governance Fakultas Ilmu Pemerintahan Universitas Sultan Agung Tirtayasa 
2, no. 1 (Juni 2017): 132. 
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group are the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, Jihadi, Salafi 
Dakwah and Salafi Sururi, Tablighi Jamaat, and Shia.23  
 
C. The Concept of Leadership of Transnational Islamic Perspective 
1.    Amir in Tablighi Jamaat 
The concept of leadership in Tablighi Jamaat ideology is called 
Amir. Although the Tablighi Jamaat is not a formal organization 
with an organizational structure, it has the highest Amir that its 
followers follow. The first performer was Maulana M. Ilyas (1885-
1944), the initiator of the Tablighi Jamaat movement in India. After 
his death, his son succeeded him as the second Amir, namely: 
Maulana M. Joseph (1917-1965). After Maulana M. Yusuf died in 
1965, Maulana M. Ilyas's great-grandson, Maulana In'am al-Hasan, 
became the third Amir. After the three of them, from 1995 onwards, 
the Tablighi Jamaat is collectively based and based in Nizamuddin 
New Delhi. 24 
As-Sirbuny in his preface to the book of Malfuzhat Three 
Hadratji, that Maulana M. Ilyas, Maulana M. Yusuf, and Maulana 
In'amul Hasan besides being called Amir are also called “Hadhratji”. 
Hadhratji/hadhrat/hadhirat is a call for a glorified person. in Urdu, 
pronunciation of "Messiah" is often used to name an elder (glorified). 
Extra "Ji" is a sincere heart to someone who was respected and 
loved.25 In the missionary activities Khuru>j fi> Sabi>lilla>h, each 
congregation is obligated to appoint one of its members to Amir. The 
appointment is made by deliberation. Amir's duty here is to lead and 
distribute the job to his members in a deliberative manner.26 Each 
decision is made in consultation led by Amir and must be supervised 
by The members of the Amir are the leaders of the troupe (jaulah) 
while preaching in the middle of the community, obtained ustadz 
                                                   
23 Ach. Syaikhu, “Pergulatan Organisasi Islam dalam Membendung Gerakan 
Ideologi Islam Transnasional,” JURNAL FALASIFA 3, no. 1 (Maret 2012): 118–19. 
24 American Policy Council, “Tablighi Jama’at,” 13 April 2015, 7, 
http://almanac.afpc.org/sites/almanac.afpc.org/files/Tablighi%20Jama%27at.pdf 
25 Syaikh Maulana M. Ilyas al-Kandhalawi, Malfuzhat Tiga Hadratji  (terj.) oleh 
A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, (Cirebon: Pustaka Nabawi, 2012), 2. 
26 Zainal Arifin, “KEPEMIMPINAN SPIRITUAL PESANTREN TEMBORO 
Strategi Kebudayaan Kiai dalam Membentuk Perilaku Religius” (Disertasi, 
Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2017), 71.  
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Saefudin, M.Pd. the following: The term "Amir" in the Tablighi 
Jamaat is a reference to the head of the group (pilgrims). To be an 
Amir there are no specific conditions, and one cannot simply 
nominate to be an Amir, since the adoption of an Amir is a matter of 
deliberation. Usually chosen to be an Amir are people who are more 
God-fearing, fair, honest, trustworthy, responsible, and able to 
protect pilgrims. This concept of Amir is in QS. an-Nisa>' [4]: 59. As 
long as Amir still commands good, Allah commands him to obey. On 
this basis, God indirectly commands us to appoint leaders. 
In the book "Mudzakarah Usaha Da'wah Rasulullah" it is 
explained that the practice of jaulah is divided into two 
congregations, namely: First, the congregations in the mosque consist 
of: (1) Z}a>ki>ri>n (meditation), (2) Taqri>r (the seated person talking 
about the greatness of Allah and his six companions, (3) Mustami' 
(taqri>r listener), and (4) Istiqba>l (the receptionist) Second, the 
congregation outside (go home) the people around the mosque) are: 
(1) Ami>r (pilgrim leaders), (2) Dali>l (guide), (3) Mutakalim 
(spokesman), and (4) Ma'mu>r (enlivening follower). 27  
Amir was the main thing is preached Da’wa>h 'ala> Minha>ji an-
Nubuwwah, meaning propaganda system that has the chain (example) 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.28 The concept of 
propaganda was based on normative and the culture of the Dawah 
model developed by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions 
The following are the arguments used by the Tabligh Congregation 
in Da’wa>h 'ala> Minha>ji an-Nubuwwah: QS. Al-Fus}ilat [41]: 33, QS. 
Adz-Dza>riya>t [51]: 55, QS. Tha>ha> [}}}} 20]: 132, QS. Luqma>n [31]: 
17, QS. A>li Imra>n [3]: 104, QS. A>li Imra>n [3]: 110, etc.29    
 
2.    The Majlis Syuro on the Jemaah Tarbiyah Ideology  
The Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia is an affiliate of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (IM) of Egypt. The Jemaah Tarbiyah then transformed 
                                                   
27 Anonim, Mudzakarah Usaha Rasulullah saw (Magetan: Pustaka al-Barokah, 
t.t.), 39. 
28 Zainal Arifin,“KEPEMIMPINAN SPIRITUAL PESANTREN TEMBORO 
Strategi Kebudayaan Kiai dalam Membentuk Perilaku Religius,” 186. 
29 Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya al-Kandahlawi Rah.a, Kita>b Fadi>lah A’ma>l 
(terj.) Tim Penerjemah Masjid Jami’ Kebon Jeruk Jakarta, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ramadhan, 
2011), 342–45. 
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into a political movement by forming the Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS). The concept of leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is called 
'Mursyid' and Hasan al-Bana itself is the first Mursyid 'Am. The 
concept of the Moslem is commonly used in the tradition of Sufism. 
It is possible to be influenced by IM ideology, T}ariqah Sunniyah and 
the Shufiyyah and even Hasan al-Banna has been active in the 
T}ariqah Hashafiyyah Syadziliyyah.30  
While the concept of leadership in the Jemaah Tarbiyah 
movement in Indonesia is called the Majlis Syuro. Majlis Syuro is the 
supreme leader of the PKS as set out in AD/ART PKS Article 14 
reads: The Majlis Syuro is the Supreme Council of the Party which 
serves as the board of the "Ahlul Halli wal-'Aqdi" (Consultative 
Assembly) Party; led by a chairman. As for the chairman of the 
Syariah Assembly during the period 2015-2020 was Dr. Salim Segaf 
Al Jufri (http://pks.id.) According to ustadz Lutfi, one of the 
activists of the Jemaah Tarbiyah movement in Salatiga that the 
leadership of the Majlis Syuro is more concerned with community 
building. The Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia, which is a Muslim 
Brotherhood (IM) affiliate in Egypt, dominates the region of Asia 
(Southeast Asia) due to its large number of followers.   
 
3.    Caliphate in the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Ideology 
HTI is a transnational movement affiliated with HT initiated by 
Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani in Palestine. It is evident from the reference 
books used by HTI that Taqiyuddin Nabhani. Thus, the concept of 
leadership offered is also adopted by the so-called HT, while the 
Islamic system of governance is Khila>fah 'Ala> Minha>j an-
Nubuwwah. The caliphate system is the system that God wants. In 
this system, the Caliph is appointed through the Qur'an and the 
sunnah. The arguments that make this statement very much are 
taken from the Bible, as-Sunnah, and Ijmak Companions. As Allah 
says in the QS al-Maidah [5]: 48.31  
                                                   
30 Otoman, “Pemikiran Politik Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949) dan Pembentukan 
Radikalisme Islam”,Tamaddun 15, no. 1 (Juni 2015): 39. 
31 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Struktur Negara Khilafah (Pemerintahan dan 
Administrasi), (terj.) oleh Yahya AR (Jakarta: HTI, 2006), 14. 
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In the system of the Caliphate there is no system of "crown 
prince". Inheritance of power has never been a law automatically 
imposed in a country, as it is in the royal system. The law for the 
legalization of power in the Islamic State is bai'at through Ahlul Halli 
wal 'Aqdi. A caliph is appointed by bai'at and is never appointed by 
inheritance,32 as is the case in the royal system. The royal system was 
not an Islamic system of government, though the king was merely a 
symbol but had no power, as were the British and Spanish empires. 
The Caliph is the ruler and executor of the Shari'a of Allah. Islam also 
does not recognize the monarchical system of kings and rulers, such 
as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, because the Caliphate does not inherit a 
monarchy like kings. The caliph was chosen and appointed instead 
of inherited. 33 
The Republic system also excludes the Islamic system because it 
rests on a democratic system in the hands of the people. The Khilafah 
system stands on the basis of the Islamic system of sovereignty in the 
hands of Shari'ah. Therefore, the Caliphate cannot be dismissed by 
the people, even though he has the right to choose and oversee and 
correct. The caliph is dismissed by the provisions of the law of shara 
'if it is against the law of shara'. Termination by decision of the court 
of magistrates who has the right to terminate the Caliph according to 
the word of Allah in the QS an-Nisa [4]: 59. The Caliphate's office in 
Islam is not limited to the duration but to the extent of the 
implementation of Islamic law. 34 
 
D. The Response of Transnational Islamic and Islam Nusantara on 
Democracy Practices In Indonesia 
Afifudin Muhajir argues that the presence of a country in the 
Islamic view is not a goal (a religion), but a means to achieve its 
purpose. The purpose of a nation is to bring about the birth of 
human beings, both in the world and in the Hereafter. In fact, Islam 
does not discriminate between religion and the state, but rather 
considers the state a religious representation in order to manage 
                                                   
32 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, (terj.) oleh Abu Amin, 
dkk, 12 (Jakarta: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2013), 84. 
33 Anonim, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir, (terj.). 
Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, 90–91. 
34  Anonim, 92–93. 
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aspects of the people's welfare. Then there is the expression al-Isla> m 
di> n wa dawlah (Islam is a religion and a country).35  
According to Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy quoted by Ahmad Syafi'i 
Maarif that in essence human beings have three glories based on QS 
al-Isra' [17]: 70, that is (1) personal glory (kara>mah fardiyah) in the art 
of Islamic preservation human and human nature, (2) the dignity of 
society (kara>mah ijtima>'iayh) in which the status of human equality 
is fully guaranteed, and (3) the political dignity (kara>mah siya>sayah) 
in which Islam gives all rights politics for humanity to be chosen for 
political positions because humans are the Caliphate on earth. 36 
Islam does not prohibit its people from being political, because it 
is part of human rights. These include the implementation of 
democratic systems in Indonesia, such as running for president, the 
House of Representatives, the Governor, and others. According to 
Afifudin Muhajir, one of the advantages of the democratic system is 
the right and obligation of the people to control, monitor, advise, and 
critique powerful leaders. This condition opens up the possibility of 
teaching alar makruf nahi munkar, as Allah Swt says in QS at-
Taubah [9]: 71. 37 
1.   The Response of The Tablighi Jamaat to Democracy 
The Tablighi Jamaat is a transnational Islamic movement that 
forbids its followers (Tablighi) to talk about politics even though 
there is no ruling on anti-politics.38 However, the Tablighi Jamaat's 
view of political issues was positive, as long as it aimed to perpetuate 
religion and the masses of people, saving from worldly suffering and 
the afterlife, not as a vehicle of lust and detachment of religious 
interests, it clearly turned their backs on Nabawi politics. 39 
The politics of Nabawi is a 'devotion' to Prophet in bringing 
people to the will of God in the world and the Hereafter, not blind 
politics that justify all means to gain wealth and the throne. Sheikh 
Zakaria said, “In the political world, people tend to be proud, 
                                                   
35 Afifudin Muhajir, Fiqh Tata Negara (Yogyakarta: IRCiSoD, 2017), 23–24. 
36 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Pancasila sebagai Dasar Negara: Studi tentang 
Perdebatan dalam Konstutuante, edisi revisi, (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2006), 171–72. 
37 Afifudin Muhajir, Fiqh Tata Negara, 109. 
38 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, cet. ke-3, 3. 
39 A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, Kupas Tuntas Jamaah Tabligh 3 
(Cirebon: Pustaka Nabawi, 2002), 58. 
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tempted to seek fame and fame. Therefore, seek only to save Islam 
from the attacks of the infidels and to prevent them from deceiving 
the Muslims. 40 
The Tablighi Jamaat has never had any aim for power or 
government. Even to politicians, Shaykh Ilyas, quoted as-Sirbuny, 
said, "I thank the politicians, because they have brought the 
government's attention to them, so that I can calmly carry out my 
preaching." , do not forbid, do not comment on the politics of any 
country. Because of this, political unrest has created a crackdown 
among Muslims. Shaykh Ilyas also has personal political views, but 
does not offer his political views to anyone. He urged his followers to 
engage in preaching, ta'lim, dhikr, worship, and service.41 In the 
opinion of ustadz Saefudin, M.Pd. the following: I think Tabligh 
Congregation followers should not be politicized, because if the 
Tablighi Jamaat or any individual following the Tablighi Jamaat is 
politically inclined, they will take their side of the political party, 
prioritizing their political parties and in all likelihood they will look 
down on political parties others or others whose ends are dividing 
the people while Islam is Rah}matan Lil’ A>lami>n.  
 
2.    The Response of The Jemaah Tarbiyah to Democracy 
The Muslim Brotherhood (IM) views the tarbiyah as an ideal way 
of interacting with humans, both directly and indirectly in 
accordance with its distinctive systems and devices to process 
changes in the human condition to better conditions.42  The IM 
describes Islam as follows: (a) The Islamic law and teachings 
governing the entire human affairs of the world and the hereafter. 
Islam is faith and worship, government and people, in and of itself, 
spiritualism and charity, as well as mushaf and sword, (b) the basics 
and basis of Islamic teaching are the book of Allah and His 
Messenger, and (3) Islam is a living system that embraces and 
governs the lives of our people and nations at all times. 43 
                                                   
40 A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, 62. 
41 A. Abdurrahman Ahmad As-Sirbuny, 66–69. 
42 Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin, 
(terj.) oleh Wahid Ahmadi, dkk, (Solo: Era Adicitra Intermedia, 2016), 5. 
43 Hasan al-Banna, Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin, (terj.) oleh Anis Matta, 
dkk (Surakarta: Era Adicitra Intermedia, 2018), 200–202. 
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The IM does not demand the legitimacy of the government for 
the sake of her and her group. The government is part of the 
Brotherhood, so they continue to work in order to cleanse them from 
the hands of the rulers who do not want to carry out the hokum of 
God.44 Therefore, the Brotherhood is also a Nationalist. Hasal al-
Banna explains the picture of Brotherhood nationalism as follows: 
Islam has clearly required work for the good and devotion to its 
homeland. A Muslim is the most nationalist and the greatest 
contribution to the nation, as God has required of them. Thus, Al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun is the one who cares for the good of his 
homeland and is most willing to sacrifice his people. They long for 
the honor, prosperity, and prosperity of their country. Al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun loves his homeland and strives to maintain his nationalist 
unity.45  
In addition to the Brotherhood of a Nationalist, but also a 
support of the Arab unity, for Hasan al-Banna, this was the second 
chain of events in the revival. In the next step, the Brotherhood 
moves to establish an Islamic unity, which is the perfect network for 
the emergence of an integrated Islamic state. Therefore, the 
Brotherhood upholds the caliphate as a symbol of the unity of Islam 
and the formal form of Muslim international unity. The Caliphate is 
a reference point for Islamic law enforcement. Therefore, the 
Companions put the caliphate first in their care of the Prophet's 
body.  46 
The Jemaah Tarbiyah's view of democracy in Indonesia is not 
very different from that of IM. According to Burhanudin Muhtadi, 
the Jemaah Tarbiyah theological thought was drawn from the ideas 
of the Hasan al-Banna Brotherhood and the Islamic Brotherhood of 
Islam al-Mawdudi which centered on the argument that Islam is (1) 
al-di>n: total way of life (aqi>dah wa shari>'ah, (2) in the world 
(religion and country), and (3) in the world (ukhrawi and world). 
The Jemaah Tarbiyah's views on democratic practice in Indonesia can 
be a solution to the establishment of Islamic State,47 thus establishing 
                                                   
44 Hasan al-Banna, 226–27. 
45 Hasan al-Banna, 232–33. 
46 Hasan al-Banna, 236–237. 
47 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, cet. ke-3, 37–41. 
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the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKS operates within the 
framework of democracy and embraces the ideas of the nation and 
promotes peaceful movement and avoids the use of force in 
achieving its goals.” 48  
 
3.    The Response of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) to Democracy 
HTI entered Indonesia in the 1980s by pioneering preaching on 
Indonesian campuses that later named itself HTI.49 It was opposed to 
the idea of democracy because of sovereignty in the hands of the 
people, it should belong to syara' 50 as Allah swt says in QS an-Nisa 
[4]: 59.51 According to HTI, democracy is born of the womb of the 
capitalist ideology that has the motto, "government of the people, by 
the people, and for the people". Democracy is a system of denial of 
man-made and not the law of Shari'a. Implementing a democratic 
system means implementing the infidelity system and calling on the 
democratic system means promoting a system of disbelief. 52 
The ideology of Capitalism is based on the separation of religion 
from life (secularism). In this ideology, man has the right to make his 
living rules, maintaining human freedom consisting of freedom of 
speech, opinion, title, and personal freedom. From this ideology 
emerges a democracy that has the view that humans have the right to 
make rules (laws) and that the people are a source of power that can 
legislate and employ heads of state to enact laws. A democratic 
system is a contract of labor between the people and the head of 
state.53 In a democratic system the authority of law is in the hands of 
men, not of God. This is contrary to His word: "... the law is God's 
only ..." (Yusuf [12]: 40).54 
                                                   
48 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 49.  
49 Ahmad Musyafiq, "Spiritualitas Kaum Fundamentalis,” 64. 
50 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Daulah Islam, (terj.) Umar Faruq, cet. ke-7, 341–342. 
51 Anonim, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir, (terj.). 
Abu Afif dan Nur Khalish, 99. 
52  Anonim, 79–80. 
53 Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Peraturan Hidup dalam Islam, (terj.) oleh Abu Amin, 
dkk, 50–51. 
54Taqiyuddin-Nabhani, Struktur Negara Khilafah (Pemerintahan dan 
Administrasi), (terj.) oleh Yahya AR, 27. 
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The draft Law Policy drafted by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani has 
outlined the concept of the caliphate system that distinguishes the 
democratic system found in Articles 22, 26, 31, and 34 as follows.55  
”The system of government is governed by four constitutions, 
namely: (a) sovereignty belongs to shara 'not to the people, (b) 
power is in the hands of the people, (c) the appointment of a 
Caliph is obligatory on all Muslims, (d) Caliphs have the right for 
the enactment of Islamic law 'and to enact basic laws and laws. 
”Every muslim, intelligent, male or female Muslim has the right 
to choose the Caliph and observe it. Non-Muslims have no right 
to vote. ”(Article 26)“ The appointment of the head of the 
caliphate is considered valid if it meets seven conditions, namely: 
male, Muslim, independent, transitional, rational, just, and 
competent.” (Article 31), and ”the method of lifting the Caliphate 
is bai'at. (Article 34) 
 
E. The Response of Islam Nusantara to Transnational Islamic and 
Democracy Practices In Indonesia 
 From the above discussion, the authors can conclude that there 
is a third difference in the Transnational Islamic ideology in 
responding to the practice of Democracy in Indonesia, as this 
ideology tends to be apolitical and influenced by a rational and 
religious focus on preaching. Second, the Jemaah Tarbiyah which has 
strong affiliations with the al-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
supported the practice of democracy in Indonesia by establishing the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) for having the view that Islam does 
not separate religion and country and embraces the concept of nation 
-state). Third, HTI affiliated with HT founded by Taqiyuddin An-
Nabhani strongly rejects the practice of democracy in Indonesia 
because it is not man-made (God-made) law. 
The Islam Nusantara has different views on these three 
Transnational Islamic ideologies. The term Islam Nusantara became 
popular after it was made public by the PBNU Chairman KH Said 
Aqil Siradj at the opening of the Istighotsah Celebrating Ramadhan 
and the Opening of the NU Scholars Alim, Sunday, June 14, 2015 at 
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the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta.56 The Islam Nusantara is the theme of 
the 33rd Nahdlatul Scholars in the East Java Wave on August 1-5, 
2015.5758 On this basis, the Islam Nusantara is identical with the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization. 
 KH Said Aqil Siradj described the Islam Nusantara as a friendly, 
anti-radical, inclusive and tolerant Islam.59 According to Azyumardi 
Azra, quoted by Abdul Chalik, the Islam Nusantara has the 
theological character of the Ash'ariyah, the Shafi’i school, and 
following the Imam Ghazali Sufism.60 The Islam Nusantara is a 
combination of Islamic theological values with Indonesian 
traditions,61 culture and customs, or the synthesis of local revelation 
and culture.62 The three pillars of the Islam Nusantara by Ma'ruf 
Amin cited by Akhiyat include: (1) thinking (intuition) including 
moderate thinking (tawassut), (2) movement (ḥarakah) for 
improvement (maslahah), and (3) real action ('amāliyyah) by 
respecting the local traditions and culture of the people as long as 
they do not deviate from Islamic values.63 
 The Islam Nusantara has a different view of Transnational 
Islamic on democracy, Pancasila, and the country. For the Nusantara 
scholars, who represent Islam and the nation are symbols and 
religious rituals are a means of establishing communion and 
                                                   
56 Mohamad Guntur Romli, Islam Kita, Islam Nusantara Lima Nilai Dasar Islam 
Nusantara, (Tangerang: Ciputat School, 2016), 17. 
57 Mujamil Qomar, “Islam Nusantara: Sebuah Alternatif Model Pemikiran, 
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62 Qomar, “Islam Nusantara,” 200. 
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Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 17, no. 1 (28 Mei 2017): 256–257. 
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spreading rahmah to the whole world.64 In the Islam Nusantara’s 
thought, Pancasila is understood as a sublime treaty between 
Indonesian Muslims and other peoples to be cared for and respected 
together.65 Islam Nusantara is in accordance with democracy because 
it is able to display the mindset such as tasamuf (tolerant), tawassuth 
(moderate), tawazun (balanced), i'tidal (upright, consistent).66  
 The acceptance of the Islam Nusantara (NU) with the 
Indonesian state concept of Pancasila has officially begun since the 
NU Muktamar in 1984 in Situbondo. Husain Muhammad (quoted by 
Abi Attabi’), explained that in the Muktamar it was agreed on 
Pancasila as the ideology of the United Nations of Indonesia (NKRI) 
final. KH Ahmad Siddiq, the main conceptualist of the 1984 
Muktamar decision. According to Husain Muhammad, there are at 
least three reasons for the acceptance of the NU against Pancasila, 
namely (1) this country is factually and practically inhabited by a 
plural and heterogeneous peoples, (2) in real Islam has no formal 
formal teaching about the State, and (3) Implementing the teachings 
of Islam is the responsibility of the people, not the responsibility of 
the State.67 At that time, KH Ahmad Siddiq (Chairman of the PBNU 
in the 80s) also conveyed his (his) views on the NU, namely: 
Tawassuth (moderate) Tawazun (balanced) Tasamuh (tolerant) 
I'tidal (Vertical, Consistent, Istiqamah), and Amar Ma'ruf Nahi 
Mungkar (Encouraging good deeds and preventing all things that 
can undermine and diminish the values of life), as well as three 
principles of brotherhood (brotherhood), namely: Islam (Islam), 
Nationality (Wathaniyyah) and Humanity (Basyariyah).68  
 Ahmad Ali MD (quoted by Abi Attabi’), explained that the NU 
received four national pillars including Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika, NKRI, and UUD 1945 for not being against Islam.69 The five 
                                                   
64 Ngatawi Al-Zastrouw, “Mengenal Sepintas Islam Nusantara,” Hayula: 
Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (30 Januari 2017): 11. 
65 Al-Zastrouw, 14. 
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67Abi Attabi’, Antologi Islam Nusantara di mata Kyai, Habib, Santri dan Akademisi, 
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reasons Indonesian Muslims accept Pancasila are: (1) Pancasila is a 
treaty (treaty) that must be fulfilled, which must be fulfilled as a 
mandate and forbidden to betray (2) Pancasila is a point of reference, 
common platform (the phrase 'sawa>’) in the national context, (3) the 
five precepts in Pancasila in accordance with Islamic teachings, (4) 
Pancasila is the "objectivity" of Islamic values, and (5) the consensus 
(ijma ') of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, NU and 
Muhammadiyah who have received Pancasila and declared that 
Pancasila was not against Islam.70  
     
F. Conclusion 
Based on the results of this study, it can be concluded as follows: 
First, the concept of leadership in the tradition of Transnational 
Islamic ideology can be distinguished as follows: (a) The Tablighi 
Jamaat mentions leaders with the term “Amir” deliberately chosen to 
proclaim the Da’wah ala>’ Minha>j Nubuwwah, (b) The Jemaah 
Tarbiyah mentions the concept of a leader with the term “Majlis 
Syuro” as the Party’s Supreme Authority functioning as “Ahlul Halli 
wal-‘Aqdi’ (The Consultative Assembly) in its political movements, 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and (c ) HTI mentions the concept 
of a leader in the term “Caliph”, while the governing system is the 
Khali>fah ‘ala> Minhaj an-Nubuwwah. 
 Second, the third response to the transnational Islamic ideology 
of democracy in Indonesia is (a) the Tablighi Jamaat forbids its 
followers to discuss politics and to give their personal political 
choices as long as they have a political impact, (2) the Jemaah 
Tarbiyah supports the practice of democracy in Indonesia, one with 
the establishment of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and (3) HTI 
rejects Pancasila ideology and democratic practice in Indonesia 
because democracy is born of the womb of capitalist ideology and is 
a system of denial of man-made rather than sharia law. In view of 
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